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This dissertation introduces a new method for evaluating mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and 
goodwill allocations associated with them. This method differs from Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), which estimate the sum of the fair value of net identifiable 
assets by focusing on balance sheet information, and recognizes the remainder of the purchase 
price as goodwill. The new method utilizes both balance sheet and income statement information 
to estimate the value of a target as a business, and treats the remainder of the purchase price as 
the uncertain growth expectation. Using the new approach, I document that uncertain growth 
expectations in M&A prices (1) are negatively related to acquirer's long-term returns, (2) predict 
future goodwill impairments, and (3) are superior to event-date market reactions and premiums 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Identifying what acquirers are paying for their targets is important in evaluating merger and 
acquisition (M&A) deals. A portion of the purchase price is paid for identifiable tangible assets 
and other portions for uncertain growth expectations like synergy effects. Current Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) focuses on balance sheet information to identify the 
value of a target. Acquirers are required to recognize the book value of targets, estimate the fair 
value of net identifiable assets, and allocate the remainder to goodwill (a plugged number). 
However, the value of a target as a business is not the sum of net identifiable assets. It is rather 
the combination of book value of assets (balance sheet numbers) and earnings-creating ability 
realized from the joint use of assets (income statement numbers).  
This study introduces a new way to evaluate M&A deals that utilize information from 
both the balance sheet and income statement to value a target as a business. I decompose 
purchase price into three components: book value, the value from predictable short-term earnings, 
and the remainder. Book value is recorded with historical cost accounting on a target's balance 
sheet. The value from predictable short-term earnings is based on a target's predictable income 
statement. The value from predictable short-term earnings, unlike the sum of the fair value of net 
identifiable assets, represents the earnings-creating ability of a target as a business. Lastly, I 
show the part of purchase price not based on a target's accounting information to have a specific 
interpretation, namely, the uncertain growth expectations (or expected synergy effects) 
associated with an M&A deal. 
This interpretation addresses the questions of whether uncertain growth expectations (1) 





and (3) better answer prior questions than measures commonly used in earlier studies, such as 
market reactions to deal announcement dates and premiums. 
The first question is important to both inside and outside investors of acquiring firms 
evaluating purchase prices. Separating overpaid M&A deals that result in negative future returns 
from successful M&A deals is critical. Using a sample of 215 mergers and acquisitions 
announced between 2001 and 2009, I find the value of uncertain growth expectations in purchase 
prices is negatively and significantly associated with acquirers' long-term returns, even after 
controlling for well-known risk factor loadings. These findings suggest that investors do not fully 
and immediately understand the implications of uncertain growth expectations in purchase prices 
for the long-term performance of acquiring firms. 
The second question is related to prior studies of managers' opportunistic behavior with 
respect to current goodwill accounting (Watts 2003; Ramanna and Watts 2012) including a study 
that shows managers with earnings-based compensation plans to be more likely to over-allocate 
to goodwill (Shalev et al. 2013), a signal of the likelihood of a future impairment, which is 
another concern for investors. How investors disentangle goodwill to evaluate the possibility of 
future impairments is not revealed in the literature. The uncertain growth expectations in 
purchase prices, which I find to be positively related to future goodwill impairments but not to 
other parts of goodwill, can thus be interpreted as the signal of goodwill impairment. 
The third question highlights the usefulness of uncertain growth expectations. Prior 
studies use market reactions on deal announcement dates to measure synergy effects (Henning et 
al. 2000; Martin and Shalev 2009; Francis and Martin 2010) and show premiums based on the 





goodwill impairments (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Li et al. 2011). These measures are based on two 
assumptions, (1) that market prices immediately and completely react to the implications of deal 
announcements, and (2) that basis prices (of targets) for premiums are not influenced by 
information leakage. The new measure introduced in this study is not subject to these 
assumptions. Indeed, uncertain growth expectations perform better than market reactions on deal 
announcement dates and premiums in predicting acquirers' future returns and future goodwill 
impairments. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to my knowledge, it is the 
first study that systematically utilizes both balance sheet and income statement information to 
evaluate M&A prices. Current accounting of business combinations is based on unverifiable 
balance sheet estimates (fair value of net identifiable assets). The present study uses predictable 
short-term earnings to evaluate M&A prices. Second, the study's major finding, that uncertain 
growth expectations of purchase prices predict acquirers' future performance, is based only on 
publicly available information (e.g., targets' form 10-Ks and analysts' forecasts). Thus, the main 
finding is useful not only to researchers, but also to practitioners including acquirers' outside 
investors. Third, the study introduces a benchmark for identifying the components of goodwill 
most likely to be impaired in the future. Many prior studies relate managers' opportunistic 
behavior to discretion in current goodwill accounting, but the literature doesn't provide a reliable 
tool for identifying which components of goodwill are related to future impairments. The 
benchmark introduced in this study provides researchers and practitioners alike with a useful tool 





The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses motivation and 
develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 explains the empirical research designs, Section 4 the 
variable estimations and sample selection process. Section 5 reports empirical findings and 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
Section 2: Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Related literature 
This paper is related to studies that examine post merger and acquisition (M&A) performance 
(Franks et al. 1991; Agrawal et al. 1992; Healy et al. 1992; Loughran and Vijh 1997; Rau and 
Vermaelen 1998) and to research that investigates managers' opportunistic behavior in M&A 
transactions (Jensen 1986; Harford 2005; Datta et al. 2001; Oler 2008). Some studies show 
premium amount to be related to future returns (Sirower 1997) and future goodwill impairments 
(Hayn and Hughes 2006; Li et al. 2011). I further demonstrate the unique contribution of the new 
measure by also using future returns and goodwill impairments to evaluate M&A performance.  
It is important to estimate the right values of targets and acquirers in M&A deals, many 
prior studies having shown mis-valuation to be related to disappointing M&A performance 
(Rhodes-Kropf et al. 2005; Moeller et al. 2005; Dong et al. 2006; Bouwman et al. 2009; Gu and 
Lev 2011). Other studies, on the other hand, show the residual-earnings model to be useful for 
predicting future stock returns (e.g., Frankel and Lee 1998; Ali et al. 2003; Penman 2011). 





decomposing market prices into reliable parts and speculative expectations. Sirower and 
O’Byrne (1998) utilize the residual earnings model to recognize the value of a target and provide 
the post-M&A performance benchmark needed to make the deal a positive net-present-value 
(NPV) project. This study applies the residual earnings model framework to breaking and 
evaluating M&A prices. 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 141 introduced fair value 
estimates of net identifiable assets, and SFAS 142 removed goodwill amortizations. Some 
studies find the information disclosed under SFAS 141 and 142 to be useful to investors 
(Kimbrough 2007 a, b). Others have studied managers' exploitation of discretion in goodwill 
accounting (Watts 2003; Beatty and Weber 2006; Ramanna 2008; Shalev 2009). Francis and 
Martin (2010) and Kravet et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between accounting 
conservatism and mergers and acquisitions, some studies show goodwill impairment charges not 
to be recognized in a timely manner (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Li and Sloan 2011; Lys et al. 2012; 
Ramanna and Watts 2012)1
 
, and Shalev et al. (2013) document companies to allocate more to 
goodwill when CEO bonus is based on earnings. But none of the many studies that examine the 
problem of discretion in goodwill accounting provide any benchmark bases on financial 
statements that can be used to identify the amount of goodwill at risk of future impairment. A 
benchmark for unverifiable reported goodwill is nevertheless fundamental to a better 
understanding of managers' opportunistic behavior, and the present study fills this gap by 
introducing a benchmark that relies exclusively on publicly available information.  
                                                          





2.2 A new method of evaluating merger and acquisition (M&A) prices 
I explain here how accounting valuation techniques from the residual earnings model can be 
applied to the evaluation of M&A prices. I then illustrate the implications for future acquirer 
performance and goodwill accounting of the purchase price components identified by valuation 
technique. 
 
2.2.1 Valuation techniques 
Penman (2011) points out the usefulness of accounting valuation techniques in general cases. 
“Accounting does not render the complete value but does tell us where our uncertainty about the 
market price lies and where we run the risk of paying too much.... [T]he uncertainty is about 
growth.”2
 
 In other words, accounting valuation techniques enable investors to evaluate where 
uncertainties lie when purchasing a stock. 
 1 20 0( ) ( ) ( )
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The residual earnings model (Ohlson 1995; Penman 2012) is based on book value (BV), 
discounted short-term residual earnings ( 1RE
ρ





), and expectations of residual earnings growth (g). The latter, being the growth rate 
implied by the market value, is termed an implied growth rate. Because the implied growth rate 
is based on what investors believe the growth rate of residual earnings will be, it is an uncertain 
expectation in the market value. Book value is based on observable balance sheets; discounted 
short-term and capitalized short-term residual earnings are based on predictable short-term 
earnings (e.g., analysts' forecasts). The implied growth rate, however, which is the expected 
residual earnings growth rate implied in the market value, is not based on current accounting 
numbers. Because the growth expectation in market value is measured by the implied growth 
rate of residual earnings, zero growth rate indicates the least uncertainty in a company's 
estimated value. Investors can thus separate market value into three components: book value, 
discounted and capitalized short-term expected residual earnings (at zero growth rate), and the 
remainder. I call capitalized short-term expected residual earnings the value from predictable 
short-term earnings (VSE) and the remainder of the market value the value from long-term 
growth ( MVVSE ). 
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 3 ( )MVVLG MV BV VSE= − +, and  is the value from long-term 
growth implied in the market value.  
 
This method of market value decomposition uses both balance sheet and income 
statement information to calculate the value of a company as a business. Book value (BV) is from 
the balance sheet, the value from predictable short-term earnings (VSE) based on reliably 
predictable income statement numbers. Book value (BV) and value from predictable short-term 
earnings (VSE) are easily justifiable with accounting information, whereas value from long-term 
growth ( MVVLG ) is not. Because the value from predictable short-term earnings (VSE) is 
estimated with no growth assumption in residual earnings, the value from long-term growth 
( MVVLG ) captures all uncertain growth expectations of market value. It is important that both 
balance sheet and income statement be incorporated in this valuation process. “Historical cost 
accounting leaves value off the balance sheet, but focuses on earnings which, we have seen, has 
an important role reducing the error from an accounting system. So there is no problem with 




2.2.2 Valuation techniques in purchase price evaluation  
                                                          
3 Note that growth rate (g) is set to zero (no growth rate) here. 





Applied to M&A cases, Penman (2011)'s quote tells us where our uncertainty about the purchase 
price lies and where we run the risk of paying too much for the target. The uncertainty is about 
growth expectations in the target's residual earnings. I utilize the residual earnings model 




Purchase Price (PP) = MV + Premium
= BV + VSE + VLG + Premium
= BV + VSE + VLG
  
where PP MVVLG =VLG + Premium , PPVLG  is the value from long term growth implied in the 
purchase price, and Premium is the amount paid above the target's market value. 
 
A company that acquires another company usually pays a premium over the target's 
market price. A premium paid over the market value, not being justifiable with the target's 
accounting, is added to the uncertain growth expectations of the purchase price ( PPVLG ). Again, 
with the residual earnings model decomposition, investors can evaluate how much is invested on 
the value from predictable short-term earnings and how much on the value from long-term 
growth (or uncertain growth expectations). The value from long-term growth ( PPVLG ) is the 
value that should be achieved as a combined entity (e.g. from synergy effects). In other words, 
the value from long-term growth ( PPVLG ) is the uncertain growth expectation in an M&A deal, 
and is not based on the target's accounting numbers. Thus, the more an acquirer pays for the 





the value of long-term growth ( PPVLG ) to predict acquirers' future performance (henceforth, 
VLG replaces PPVLG ). 
 
2.2.3 Fair value adjustment and value from predictable short-term earnings 
Current goodwill accounting has a unique feature: a target's identifiable assets should be 
evaluated at fair value and the difference between the purchase price and fair value of net 
identifiable assets be recognized as goodwill. 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )Purchase Price PP = BV + Fair Value Adjustment FVadj +GoodWill GW   
 
This is a balance sheet approach to evaluating and allocating M&A purchase prices. 
Being the sum of fair value of net identifiable assets, the fair value adjustment does not include 
the earnings-creating ability of a target's assets used jointly in a business. For example, the value 
of Dell computer is not a simple sum of the fair value of the brand, inventories, and factories, but 
its ability to generate earnings by combining brand with innovative supply and distribution 
channels. Current goodwill accounting being focused more on the value of separable assets than 
on the value of a target as a business, reported goodwill is not economically interpretable 





The value from predictable short-term earnings, on the other hand, being capitalized 






), uses a target's balance sheet 
and income statement and captures its earnings-creating ability as well. Because the sum of book 
value and the value from predictable short-term earnings indicates the value of a target as a 
business, the remainder of the purchase price (the value from long-term growth) is economically 
interpretable as the amount paid in excess of a target's value, as captured by the uncertain growth 
expectation in the purchase price.  
The uncertain growth expectation in the purchase price has an additional implication for 
goodwill accounting. It can provide a benchmark for evaluating goodwill. Current goodwill 
accounting is based on non-verifiable fair values of identifiable assets, as estimated by managers. 
All estimates being balance sheet based, this is a balance sheet approach. Moreover, since SFAS 
142, that goodwill is not amortized and only tested for non-temporary impairments provides an 
incentive for managers who care about short-term earnings to understate the fair value of net 
identifiable assets, which results in goodwill being overstated (Shalev et al. 2013). The uncertain 
growth expectation achieves independence from managerial over-allocation incentives by 
utilizing both balance sheet and income statement numbers. I show uncertain growth 
expectations to be related to future goodwill impairments, in particular, that goodwill that cannot 
be accounted for by accounting information is more likely to be impaired. 
Figure 1 compares the decomposition of purchase prices based on current GAAP 
accounting (left column) with the new method that uses both balance sheet and income statement 
information to estimate a target's value. The left column shows goodwill to be a plugged number 





term earnings (VSE) is the estimated value of a target based on predictable short-term earnings 






). The dotted line between goodwill and 
value from long-term growth indicates that goodwill can be decomposed into value from long-
term growth (VLG) and the remainder (GWother). 
 
2.2.4 Summary of M&A price allocation and goodwill decomposition 
 
PP = BV +VSE +VLG
= BV + FVadj +GW




In summary, investors can identify three components (BV, VSE, and VLG) of purchase 
price based on a target's financial statement information. BV is readily available from the balance 
sheet, VSE estimated with the zero growth in residual earnings benchmark, and VLG, the 
uncertain growth expectation, which is the remainder. Investors can use VLG to decompose 
goodwill into goodwill other than the value from long-term growth (GWother) and VLG. 
Goodwill other than the value from long-term growth (GWother) is the difference between 
reported goodwill (GW) and the value from long-term growth (VLG). Appendix B provides a real 






2.3 Hypothesis development 
2.3.1 Uncertain growth expectations and acquirers' future returns 
The first research question to be examined is how much is paid for uncertain growth expectations 
in M&As, and whether this information has implications for acquirers' future long-term 
performance. To decide whether or not to buy a stock at its current market price, investors need a 
tool that can evaluate implicit growth uncertainties. If the current market price includes a lot of 
growth uncertainty, the investment is risky. Valuation studies in accounting provide a useful tool 
for evaluating implied growth uncertainties in stock price (Penman 2011) that enables investors 
to make buy-or-sell decisions based on accounting information that challenges market prices.  
An M&A deal is characterized by a purchase price rather than market price. In order to 
evaluate and predict the success of an M&A deal, an investor needs to challenge the purchase 
price, which is usually determined not in the open market by numerous buyers and sellers, but in 
negotiations between sellers and a small number of bidders. Prior studies show that managers 
make many value-destroying M&A deals (Harford 2005; Oler 2008; Moeller et al. 2005) and pay 
higher premiums if their compensation is less tied to equity values (Datta et al. 2001), and 
Sirower (1997) shows paying a high premium to be negatively related to long-term stock returns. 
It is thus important to understand what acquirers are paying for targets and estimate implied 
uncertainties in the purchase prices when evaluating the acquirers' performance. I utilize 
valuation techniques to estimate the implied uncertainties in purchase prices and identify the 
attendant uncertain growth expectations as the value from long-term growth (VLG). Because 






Hypothesis 1a: The value from long-term growth (VLG) is negatively related to acquirers' long-
term returns. 
 
This study is motivated in part by the drawbacks of two popular measures used to 
evaluate M&A deals: deal announcement date returns (AnnRet), and premiums based on a 
target's market value (Prem4wk). These measures are based on targets' market values and subject 
to market conditions unrelated to fundamental characteristics of acquisitions (Bouwman et al. 
2009). Premiums also fluctuate depending on the timing of a target's market value, and prior 
studies don't provide sufficient justification for when the market value of a target should be 
measured. VLG, because it is not based on market value, is not subject to these issues. I thus 
hypothesize that acquirers' future returns are better predicted by VLG than by deal announcement 
date returns (AnnRet) or premiums based on a target's market value (Prem4wk). 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Acquirers' long-term returns are more closely associated with the value from 
long-term growth (VLG) than with deal announcement date returns (AnnRet) or premiums 
(Prem4wk). 
 
If its implications were fully understood by investors and immediately reflected in stock 
prices, the value from long-term growth (VLG) would not be related to acquirers' long-term 





term growth (VLG) on deal announcement dates, I hypothesize the value from long-term growth 
(VLG) to be unrelated to returns around deal announcements. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: The value from long-term growth (VLG) is not associated with event-date returns 
around M&A deal announcements. 
 
2.3.2 Uncertain growth expectations and goodwill accounting 
The second question to be examined is whether the uncertain growth expectations of purchase 
prices have implications for goodwill accounting. I argue that they provide a benchmark for 
reported goodwill.  
Managers have incentives to over-allocate to goodwill because of new accounting rules 
governing business combinations (SFAS 141) and intangible assets (SFAS 142)5 The new 
business combination accounting includes discretion that can be opportunistically exploited by 
managers through estimation of the fair value of net identifiable assets.6
                                                          
5 Before SFAS 141, companies in business combinations chose between the pooling of interests and purchase (when 
accompanied by an exchange of stock) methods. Under the pooling of interests method, two companies' assets and 
liabilities are simply combined. More important, “aggregate income is not changed since the total resources are not 
changed” (APB Opinion 16, par. 28). Under the purchase method, acquirers estimate the fair value of net 
identifiable assets and record the difference between it and the purchase price as goodwill, amortized and expensed 
for no more than 40 years. Thus, short-term earnings are less in the purchase than in the pooling of interests method. 
 I suggest that mangers 
have incentives to reduce the fair value of net identifiable assets. SFAS 141 requires acquirers to 
estimate the fair value of acquired assets and liabilities including, if they are legally transferable 
6 Another issue is estimation of the market value of carrying goodwill for impairment tests. Prior studies that 
examine the second issue, which can be interpreted as whether companies recognize goodwill impairments in a 
timely manner (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Li and Sloan 2011; Lys et al. 2012; Ramanna and Watts 2012), show that 
companies do not fully recognize impaired goodwill in a timely manner. This study examines the former issue, the 





or separable, intangible assets. Goodwill being the difference between purchase price and the fair 
value of net identifiable assets, understatement of the latter results in overstatement of goodwill, 
which, given that goodwill is not amortized under SFAS 142, results in lower short-term 
expenses that increase earnings. Thus, not all components of goodwill are at same level of 
impairment risk. The uncertain growth expectations indicate the portion of goodwill not based on 
a target's value that is more likely to be impaired. The uncertain growth expectations of purchase 
prices are also not associated with the issue of goodwill allocation because the latter is not 
decided by managers. This leads to my second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The value from long-term growth (VLG) is correlated with future goodwill 
impairments. 
 
As I did to test Hypothesis 1b, I examine whether uncertain growth expectations perform 
better than deal announcement date returns and premiums in predicting future goodwill 
impairments.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Future goodwill impairments are more closely related to the value from long-







Section 3: Research Design 
I present here the empirical models that test the hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Test of uncertain growth expectations and acquirers' future returns 
I test Hypothesis 1a by examining movements in cumulative raw and size adjusted returns for 
three portfolios formed on the basis of VLG after deal announcements. This measure indicates 
the percentage of uncertain growth expectations over purchase price. I report mean cumulative 
raw and size-adjusted returns for these three portfolios for up to 24 months. I further test whether 
VLG provides additional explanatory power on future returns over the four well-known risk 
factors related to stock returns. Control variables related to the performance of acquirers are 
included in the model. I run a cross-sectional regression with equation (1) for cumulative raw 
and size adjusted returns of one year and two years after deal announcement. 
 
 
t+i 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
11 12
Ret = b +b VLG+b AnnRet +b Prem4wk
+b Beta+b Size+b BTM +b MOM
+b Focus+b PctStock +b OVI
+b PctStock OVI +b RelSize+e⋅
 (1) 
where t+iRet  is size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for year i after deal announcement; 
VLG is value from long-term growth; AnnRet is value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns 
around deal announcements (three days); Prem4wk is the premium paid by acquirers based on 





Beta is estimated from a regression of monthly returns ( fR R− ) on market returns ( m fR R− ) 
using the 36-month return period; Size is the log market value of the acquirer. BTM is acquirers’ 
book-to-market ratio before the deal announcement; MOM is the size adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns for the six month period before the deal announcement; Focus is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same; PctStock is 
the percentage of payment made with stocks; OVI is an overvalued share indicator variable 
which is equal to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first 
quintile, zero otherwise; RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the market value of an acquirer. 
 
I test Hypothesis 1b by comparing the coefficients on VLG, AnnRet, and Prem4wk. If 
VLG is better at predicting acquirers' long-term returns, t+iRet  should be more closely associated 
with VLG than with AnnRet and Prem4wk. 
I next examine whether investors immediately reflect the implications of VLG for M&A 
deals. I test with Hypothesis 1a the relationship between VLG and long-term returns (one and 
two year cumulative raw returns after deal announcements). If VLG has implications for M&A 
deals, and investors immediately understand these implications, stock prices around event dates 
should reflect the information. I test whether VLG is related to event-date returns around deal 
announcements, that is, Hypothesis 1c, using the following model: 
 
 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
AnnRet = b +b VLG+b Prem4wk +b Focus






where AnnRet is the value-weighted Cumulative Abnormal Return around deal announcement 
(three days); Prem4wk is the premium paid by acquirers based on the target's market price four 
weeks prior to deal announcement (rescaled by purchase price); Focus is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same; PctStock is the 
percentage of payment made with stocks; OVI is an overvalued share indicator variable which is 
equal to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first quintile, zero 
otherwise; and RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the market value of an acquirer. 
 
If investors immediately and fully understand the implications of VLG, I expect the 
coefficient on VLG ( 1β ) to be negative and significant.  
 
3.2 Test of goodwill impairments 
I test Hypothesis 2a and 2b using the following logistic regression model.  
 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
Logit(GWI)= b +b GW +b GWother +b VLG
+b AnnRet +b Prem4wk +b Size+b Ret




where GWI is an indicator variable equal to one if goodwill impairment of the identified target is 







; GWother is the difference between value from long-term growth (VLG) 
and GW; VLG is the value from long-term growth; GW, VLG, and GWother are scaled by 
purchase price (PP); AnnRet is the value-weighted Cumulative Abnormal Return around deal 
announcement (three days); Prem4wk is the premium paid by acquirers based on the target's 
market price four weeks prior to deal announcement (rescaled by purchase price); Size is the 
acquier's log market value; Ret is acquirers’ size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over 12 
month period after deal announcements; Focus is an indicator variable equal to one if the two-
digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same; PctStock is the percentage of payment made 
with stocks; and OVI is an overvalued share indicator variable which is equal to one if the 
acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first quintile, zero otherwise; Year is 
a year fixed effect dummy; and targetSIC is the target's two-digit SIC code. 
Equation 3 tests the relationship between goodwill impairments (GWI) and both goodwill 
(GW) and goodwill components (GWother, and VLG). Prior studies have shown higher 
premiums to result in goodwill impairments (Hayn and Hughes 2006, Li et al. 2011). Following 
this line of research, a premium measure (Prem4wk) is included in the model. Additional 
controls include acquirer size and focused mergers and acquisitions (Focus). Gu and Lev (2011) 
find managers with overpriced shares to be more likely to pay more for a target, and overpriced 
shares to tend to drive a higher likelihood of future goodwill impairment. Following these 
findings, I control for method of payment (PctStock) and acquirers' overpricing of shares (OVI). 
If payment for overpriced shares is related to goodwill impairment, I expect the coefficient on 
                                                          
7 Following Shalev et al. (2013), I define goodwill as the sum of the amount of goodwill disclosed in 10-Ks and the 





the interaction between PctStock and PE to be positive and significant. Year and target industry 
fixed effects are also included in the model.  
In this model, which tests Hypothesis 2a, positive coefficients on the variables indicate 
that the likelihood of goodwill impairment increases as goodwill (or its components) increases. 
My main focus is the coefficient on goodwill (GW) and value from long-term growth (VLG). I 
expect positive and significant coefficients on GW, which can be interpreted as the probability of 
impairment increasing as overall goodwill increases. A positive and significant relationship 
between value from long-term growth (VLG) and goodwill impairment (GWI) suggests that VLG 
captures the portion of goodwill more at risk of being impaired. 
I test Hypothesis 2b by comparing the coefficients and t-statistics of the VLG, AnnRet, 
and Prem4wk variables. I expect the value from long-term growth (VLG) to be positively 
associated with goodwill impairment, and goodwill impairment to be more closely related to 
VLG than to AnnRet and Prem4wk.  
 
Section 4: Data 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
The initial sample is collected from the Thomson SDC Platinum mergers and acquisitions 
database. I consider only mergers and acquisitions announced between June 30, 2001, the 





between the pooling and purchase (when share exchange is involved) methods of business 
combination accounting. SFAS 141 eliminated the pooling method and required all business 
combinations to be accounted for by the purchase method. All observations in my sample period, 
being accounted for by the purchase method, are thus comparable. I also require both acquirers 
and targets to be traded on major U.S. stock markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX), and 
include only deals worth at least $10 million that involve acquisition of 100% of a target's shares. 
If either acquirer or target is in the financial industry (SIC 6000-6999), the observation is 
excluded from the sample.  
From a sample of 708 acquisitions that satisfy these requirements, a final sample of 423 
observations remains after matching with COMPUSTAT, Firstcall actual announcement date, 
and I/B/E/S analyst forecasts with at least two-year forecasting horizons. Firstcall actual 
announcement dates are required to confirm a target's last financial statement before deal 
announcement. I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecasts proxy for one and two year earnings after the 
last financial statement report in the residual earnings model. I require that deal announcements 
for multiple acquisitions be at least 36 months apart. Purchase price allocation data was hand 
collected from 10-K filings found in the SEC EDGAR website. From the 423 observations, 243 
merger and acquisition cases were identified.  
I recognize in these observations goodwill impairment firm years in which companies 
report pretax impairments of goodwill (GDWLIP). Because Compustat does not provide detailed 
information about goodwill impairments, including all recognized goodwill impairments in a 





impairment I need to verify, with purchase price allocation data, whether a reported goodwill 
impairment is related to a specific acquisition.  
To confirm the relationship between price allocation and future goodwill impairment, I 
manually check, for every case, whether the reported goodwill impairment is related to the 
acquisition in the sample. Some companies associate specific acquisitions with reported goodwill 
impairments. In the many cases in which companies do not identify which prior mergers or 
acquisitions are related to goodwill impairments, I compare the business of the segment reporting 
goodwill impairment and business of the target company in the sample. If they are similar, I 
assume the goodwill impairment to be related to the target in the sample. Because I define 
goodwill as the sum of goodwill disclosed in 10-Ks and indefinite life intangibles, asset-write 
downs related to the latter are treated as goodwill impairments. The final sample includes 215 
observations. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process.8
 
 
4.2 Variable estimation 
I explain the estimation procedure for VSE and VLG. 
 
 1t t t tBV BV Earnings Dividend−= + −   
 t t t t -1RE (Residual Earnings )= Earnings -(1- r) BV⋅   
                                                          






where, ρ= Cost of  Capital +1   
 
Book value (BV ) 9 is common shareholders' equity following Nissim and Penman (2001). 
Following Frankel and Lee (1998) and Ali et al. (2003), I/B/E/S consensus analysts' earnings 
estimates proxy for future earnings. Because I use a two-period residual earnings model, analyst 
forecasts for the next two periods are required in the sample. Dividends per share (DVPSP) are 
used to calculate the dividend payout ratio, which is assumed to be constant for the second year. 
In the main analysis, similar to Penman and Sougiannis (1998), non-company specific cost of 
capital is used (risk free rate (10-year T-bill rate) together with a 5% risk premium)10
To decompose goodwill, purchase price (PP) and goodwill (GW)
.  
11 were hand-collected 
from SEC 10-K filings. Because acquirers are required to immediately expense acquisition costs 
included in the purchase price before SFAS 141R was introduced, reported acquisition costs are 
added to purchase prices for deals made after December 15, 2008 (the effective date of SFAS 
141R). If expensed acquisition costs are not reported, I add an additional two percent of purchase 
price is the average of reported acquisition cost over purchase price in the sample. to the 
purchase price. If I/B/E/S analyst forecasts predict negative future earnings, VSE turns negative12
 
 
and is replaced with zero. VLG is calculated by subtracting BV and VSE from PP. 
                                                          
9 The calculation of BV is explained in Appendix A. 
10 Other possible future earnings estimates and an alternative way of estimating the cost of capital are discussed in 
Section 5 as robustness tests. 
11 Indefinite life intangibles are included in the amount of reported goodwill because, like goodwill, they are not 
amortized. 





4.3 Summary statistics 
Table 2, panel A reports basic descriptive statistics. Average purchase price is about $2,240 
million, with companies allocating slightly more than half of purchase price to goodwill. About 
27 percent of acquirers in the sample report goodwill impairments (GWI). Book value (BV) of 
the target counts for about 39 percent of purchase price. The portion of uncertain growth 
expectations over purchase price (VLG) is about 47 percent. The difference (GWother) between 
goodwill (GW) and uncertain growth expectations (VLG) is, on average, about 10 percent of 
purchase price. Acquirers that report M&A deals experience, on average, negative market 
reactions (-3 percent) on three-day windows around deal announcements (AnnRet). The average 
premium (Prem4wk) of 33 percent is based on target prices four weeks prior to deal 
announcement, rescaled by purchase price. About 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions are 
made within the same industry (Focus) and about 41 percent of purchase prices paid with the 
acquirer's stock (PctStock). The average deal size over the market value of an acquirer is about 
40 percent (RelSize). 
Table 2, panels B and C report descriptive statistics for the non-impairment and 
impairment samples. PP and GW are slightly higher for the impairment sample. Interestingly, 
average VLG is greater in the non-impairment than in the impairment sample, but this difference 
in the means is not statistically significant, variance in these variables being high. Only acquirer 
VSE, Size, OV and RelSize are statistically different in the non-impairment and impairment 
samples. 
Table 3 summarizes correlations between the analyzed variables. The upper (lower) 





with VLG, but positively correlated with GW and GWother. That VLG is negatively correlated 
with goodwill impairments is surprising, and can be interpreted as positive synergy effects. As 
expected, VLG and AnnRet are almost not correlated. However, I am interested in multivariate 
rather than univariate relations. To avoid multicollinearity problems, explanatory variables in the 
estimation models are carefully selected. In untabulated results, the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) that test the multicollinearity problem are below 10 for all variables in every estimation 
model in the study. 
 
Section 5: Results 
 
5.1 Empirical Findings 
5.1.1 Results of uncertain growth expectations and acquirers' future returns 
Figure 2 illustrates the mean Cumulative Raw Returns (panel A) and size-adjusted Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (panel B) of three portfolios for 24 months after deal announcement.13
                                                          
13 Six companies in the sample were delisted during the 24 months, merger being the delisting reason for all six. 
Similar to Penman and Reggiani (2013), the CRSP delisting return is applied for the first month and reinvestment at 
the risk-free rate assumed. See also Shumway (1997). 
 Table 
4 reports numerical values of them. Three portfolios are formed on the basis of the value from 
long-term growth (VLG), being the percentage of uncertain growth expectations in purchase 
prices, which I expect to predict future returns. If all implications of VLG are reflected in stock 





Figure 2 shows the mean the mean Cumulative Raw Returns and size-adjusted 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to be negatively correlated with VLG. The mean the mean 
Cumulative Raw Returns and size-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns are low for 
companies with high, and high for companies with low, VLG. Although this relationship is less 
strong for the first five months, the negative relations between VLG the mean Cumulative Raw 
Returns and size-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns hold for long-term returns. I interpret 
these findings as investors not fully understanding and reflecting the implications of uncertain 
long-term growth expectations in purchase prices (VLG) at the time of deal announcements. 
 
Table 5 confirms the findings reported in Figure 2 and Table 4. Table 5, panel A reports 
the empirical results from the estimation of Model 1 with size adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns ( t+1Ret ) for one year since deal announcement. Robust standard errors are used in the 
estimation. The negative and significant relationship observed in column (1) between VLG and 
one-year size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns ( t+1Ret ) is reported conditional on the 
market beta (Beta), size (Size), and book-to-market (BTM). Column (2) shows VLG to be 
negatively associated with t+1Ret , even when momentum measure (MOM) is included in the 
model. The coefficients on VLG are -0.21 and -0.22 for column (1) and (2) respectively. These 
findings suggest that if an acquirer pays one percent more for uncertain growth expectations 
(VLG) in purchase prices acquirers’ long-term returns would be decreased by about 0.2 percent 
one year after deal announcements. Prior studies use deal announcement date returns (AnnRet) 
and premiums (Prem4wk) to measure the long-term performance of M&A deals. When AnnRet 





significant, but AnnRet and Prem4wk are not significant. This finding suggests that future 
acquirer performance is better predicted by VLG than by AnnRet or Prem4wk. The negative and 
significant relationship in column (4) between VLG and t+1Ret  holds even when the control 
variables (Focus, PctStock, OVI, the interaction between acquirers' PctStock and OVI, and 
RelSize) are included in the model. The negative coefficient on PctStock is as expected, but the 
positive coefficient on the interaction between acquirers' PctStock and OVI is surprising. 
Table 5, panel B shows the relationship between VLG and size adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns ( t+2Ret ) for two years since deal announcement. VLG is negatively and 
significantly related to two-year size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (even when four risk 
factors; Beta, Size, BTM, and MOM are included in the models). In column (3), AnnRet is also 
negatively and significantly, but less significantly than VLG, related to t+2Ret . These findings 
suggest that the explanatory power of VLG for long-term returns is incremental to the four risk 
factors and to AnnRet and Prem4wk. 
Table 6 reports the empirical tests of Hypothesis 1c and Model 2. That VLG is not 
significantly related to AnnRet suggests that investors do not fully understand the implications of 
VLG in purchase prices at the time of deal announcements, and that stock prices do not 
immediately reflect this information. In the second column, both VLG and Prem4wk are 
insignificant. Taken together with the findings reported in Table 5, this finding confirms that 
investors do not immediately understand the implications of VLG for M&A deals. 
 





Table 7 reports the empirical results from the estimation of equation 3, a logistic regression 
model that examines the relation between goodwill impairment and purchase price allocation 
items with control variables. The first two columns of Table 7 provide estimation results for the 
relation between goodwill (GW) and goodwill impairment (GWI). Similar to findings in Hayn 
and Hughes (2006) and Li and Sloan (2011), the coefficient on GW is positive (1.34) but slightly 
insignificant. The interpretation of the positive relation between GW and GWI is straightforward. 
If companies record more goodwill, the probability of reporting goodwill impairment increases. 
However, this relationship is not strong as reported in prior studies. The negative coefficient on 
Size suggests that the probability of goodwill impairments decreases as acquirers become larger. 
Following Gu and Lev (2011), who document that companies that use overpriced shares in 
mergers and acquisitions are more likely to report goodwill impairments, I add the percentage of 
deal amount paid with stock (PctStock) and a proxy for overpriced shares of acquirer (OVI). The 
interaction between PctStock and OVI are negatively associated with goodwill impairment, but 
the relationships are insignificant, and the coefficient on OVI is negatively correlated with 
goodwill impairment. To examine whether market reactions and premiums have implications for 
goodwill impairment, market reactions on deal announcement dates (AnnRet) and premiums 
(Prem4wk) are included in the model (the second column of Table 7). I find neither to be 
significantly related to goodwill impairment.  
The estimation results of equation 3 with decomposed goodwill items are presented in 
Table 7, columns (3) and (4). Column (3) reports the result for a test of Hypothesis 2a. In this 
model, I replace goodwill with value from long-term growth (VLG), which I expect to be 
positively related to goodwill impairment, and the remainder (GWother). The coefficients on 





impairment. This finding suggests that VLG captures a portion of goodwill that is related to 
goodwill impairment. In column (4), market reactions on deal announcement dates (AnnRet) and 
premiums (Prem4wk) are included in the model. VLG is still positive (2.28) and significant after 
controlling for AnnRet and Prem4wk, GWother positive but not significant. AnnRet is negative 
and insignificant, Prem4wk positive and insignificant. That columns (3) and (4) have the same 
2PseudoR s means that AnnRet and Prem4wk do not add any explanatory power to the model.  
In column (5) and (6), the explanatory powers of GW and VLG on goodwill impairments 
are compared. When both measures are included in the model, only VLG is positive and 
significant. This means that VLG is better in predicting goodwill impairments than GW. If 
AnnRet and Prem4wk are included in the model, VLG is the most closely related to the dependent 
variable, even it is slightly insignificant (P-value 11%), than other variables (GW, AnnRet, and 
Prem4wk). 
In summary, the findings in Table 7 show the uncertain growth expectations of purchase 
prices (VLG) to be positively related to goodwill impairments. VLG captures the components of 
goodwill that hamper profitability. In other words, the new method introduced in this paper 
provides a useful tool to identify a portion of goodwill that predicts future impairments. 
 
5.2 Robustness tests 
5.2.1 Goodwill and value from long-term growth in predicting long-term returns 
In this section, I test whether GW and its components predict long-term returns. In real world 





investors do not know the amount of allocated goodwill at the time of deal announcements, and 
they cannot use goodwill as a predictor for long-term returns. With ex-post reported goodwill 
(GW), I assume that GW is available at the time of deal announcement and test whether GW and 
its components (GWother and VLG) predict long-term returns. I also examine whether VLG is 
better than GW in predicting long-term returns. 
 
 
t+i 0 1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
Ret = b +b GW +b GWother +b VLG
+b AnnRet +b Prem4wk
+b Beta+b Size+b BTM +b MOM
+b Focus+b PctStock +b OVI +b PctStock OVI +e⋅
 (4) 
where all variables are as defined in equation (1) and (3). 
 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for equation (4). One-year size adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns ( t+1Ret ) is used as a dependent variable for columns (1), (2) and (3), two-year 
size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns ( t+2Ret ) for columns (4), (5), and (6). Columns (1) 
and (4) show that GW is not significantly associated with long-term returns. If GW is 
decomposed into GWother and VLG, only VLG is negatively and significantly related to long-
term returns (column 2). When GW and VLG are included in the model at the same time, VLG 
predicts long-term returns while GW does not (columns 3 and 6). In summary, these findings 
suggest that, similar to goodwill impairment tests, VLG captures a portion of GW that has 






 5.2.2 Companies with negative value from predictable short-term earnings 
In the main analysis, I replace with zero any negative value from predictable short-term earnings 
(VSE). Equation (4), below, tests whether the relationship between value from long-term growth 
(VLG) and size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns ( t+iRet ) differs for companies with a 
negative value from predictable short-term earnings. 
 
 
t+i 0 1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
Ret = b +b VLG+b NegVSE +b VLG NegVSE
+b AnnRet +b Prem4wk
+b Beta+b Size+b BTM +b MOM




where NegVSE is equal to 1 if VSE is less than zero, and 0 otherwise. Other variables are as 
defined in Model (1). 
 
Table 9 reports the estimation results. One-year size adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns ( t+1Ret ) is used as a dependent variable for columns (1) and (2), two-year size adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns ( t+2Ret ) for columns (3) and (4). As expected, VLG is negatively 
and significantly related to one-year size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. NegVSE and its 
interaction with VLG are not significantly related with the dependent variable. Interestingly, 
NegVSE is positively and significantly related to two-year size adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns. This finding suggests that companies that acquire targets with negative residual earnings 





interactions between VLG and NegVSE are negative for all estimations. The coefficients on this 
interaction are negatively and significantly related only to two-year size adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns. That the absolute value of the interaction term is larger than the absolute value 
of NegVSE means that the overall effect of NegVSE on two-year size adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns is negative.  
 
5.2.3 Value of targets and its components in predicting long-term returns 
In section (2), using valuation techniques, I decompose M&A purchase prices into three things: 
book value (BV), the value from short-term earnings (VSE), and the value from long-term growth 
(VLG). Since VLG is not justifiable with current accounting information, it indicates uncertain 
growth expectations in purchase prices. It is documented in a previous section that VLG is 
negatively related to future long-term returns. In this section, I test how the other portion (TgtVal) 
of purchase prices, which is justifiable with current accounting information (BV and VSE), is 
associated with long term returns. 
 
 
t+i 0 1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13
Ret = b +b TgtVal +b BV +b VSE
+b AnnRet +b Prem4wk
+b Beta+b Size+b BTM +b MOM
+b Focus+b PctStock +b OVI +b PctStock OVI +e⋅
 (6) 
where TgtVal is the value of a target, which is the sum of BV and VSE. Other variables are as 





Table 10 reports the estimation results for equation (6). Since TgtVal is the rest of 
purchase prices other than VLG, I expect positive relations between TgtVal and long-term returns. 
As expected, TgtVal is positively and significantly related to long-term returns. Then, I test 
which components of TgtVal are related to long-term returns. When I decompose TgtVal into BV 
and VSE, coefficients on both BV and VSE are positive but only BV is significantly associated 
with long-term returns. These findings suggest that acquirers’ long-term returns are higher as 
they pay more for values based on justifiable accounting numbers, and this relationship is mostly 
from buying targets’ book value. 
 
5.2.4 Alternative future earnings 
I test the main results' robustness to alternative future earnings proxies by examining the main 
results with other proxies for future earnings, namely, one year lead on analysts' forecasts and 
current core earnings. Current core earnings is the difference between comprehensive net income 
and unusual operating income (UOI), the latter defined as in Nissim and Penman (2001). 
VLG measures estimated with these two alternative future earnings proxies nicely predict 
and differentiate from the other groups returns for the lowest VLG portfolio. Conversely, 
cumulative abnormal returns for the medium and high VLG groups are not distinctively different. 
These other VLG measures estimated with the two alternative future earnings proxies are 
positively and significantly related to goodwill impairments suggests that the main findings are 






5.2.5 Additional robustness tests 
Lastly, I check that the findings are not driven by extreme values by performing the main 
analysis with both winsorized and truncated samples at the 1 and 2 percent levels. That the main 
and reported results are similar suggests that they are not sensitive to outliers. 
 
Section 6: Conclusions 
This study introduces a new approach to evaluate M&A deals that enables investors to find out 
how much they paid for uncertain growth expectations (VLG) when an acquirer buys another 
company. I document two implications or uncertain growth expectations (VLG) for acquirers' 
future performance, (1) a negative relation to long-term returns, and (2) a positive relation to 
future goodwill impairments, and find VLG to be a better predictor of future acquirer 
performance than other measures commonly used to evaluate M&A deals (e.g., market reactions 
on deal announcement dates and premiums on a target's market value). In summary, the new 
method and findings described in this paper suggest that investors do not fully incorporate the 
implications of targets' accounting information for the future performance of acquirers. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a way to evaluate M&A deals using 
information from both balance sheets and income statements. It also provides a measure that can 
predict, based on publicly available data, acquirers' future performance, and identifies portions of 
goodwill that predict future goodwill impairments. The accounting approach introduced in this 
study thus provides a highly effective tool for evaluating merger and acquisition deals that is 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides definitions and descriptions of the variables used in this study. 
Variable Definition Description 
GWI Goodwill impairment Indicator variable equal to 1 if a company reported 
goodwill impairment related to the target with 
purchase price allocation data in any year after the 
merger or acquisition, 0 otherwise. When a company 
does not explicitly disclose the acquisition related to 
the impairment, the relationship between the target 
and the impairment is checked manually. If the 
business of the segment reporting goodwill 
impairment is similar to the business of the target 
before the combination, the impairment is assumed to 
be related to the target.  
 
GWI also includes write-downs of indefinite life 
intangibles. 
PP Purchase price (in 
$ millions) 
Purchase price as reported in the acquiring company's 
10-K. Reported acquisition costs are added to 
purchase prices for deals made after December 15, 
2008 (effective date of SFAS 141R). If expensed 
acquisition cost is not reported, 2.7% of purchase 
price (average reported acquisition cost over purchase 
price in the sample) is added to purchase price. 
BV Book Value (scaled by PP ) Common shareholders' equity (CSE)/ Common 
shares outstanding (CSHO) 
CSE is defined following the appendix in Nissim and 
Penman (2001): 
CSE=Common equity (CEQ)+Preferred treasury 
stock (TSTKP)-Preferred dividends in arrears 
(DVPA). 
If CSHO is missing, Common shares used to 
calculate basic earnings per share (CSHPRI) replaces 
CSHO. 
VSE Value from predictable 
short-term earnings (scaled 
by PP ) 
Sum of discounted first period earnings and 
capitalized second period earnings with no growth 
assumption. If negative, VSE is replaced with zero. 
VLG Value from long-term 
growth (scaled by PP) 
Purchase price (PP)-Book value (BV)-Value from 
short-term accounting (VSA). 
FVadj Fair value adjustment 
(scaled by PP) 
Fair value of net identifiable assets (FVadj) 






Appendix A (Continued) 
Variable Definition Description 
GW Goodwill (scaled by PP) The amount of purchase price allocated to 
goodwill as reported in the acquiring 
company's10-K and the amount of indefinite life 
intangibles. 
GWother Goodwill other than the value 
from long-term growth 
(scaled by PP) 
The difference between the value from long-term 




Announcement date returns of 
acquirers 
AnnRet is the value-adjusted Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (three days) around deal 
announcements. The following trading day is taken 
as the announcement date for deals announced on a 
non-trading day. 
Prem4wk Acquisition premium  Prem4wk is the amount of premium based on the 
price of a target four weeks prior to deal 
announcement. 
Beta Beta of acquirer Beta is estimated from a regression of monthly 
returns ( fR R− ) on market returns ( m fR R− ) 
using the 36-month return period.  
Size Size of acquirer Logarithm of the market value of the acquirer. 
(MKVALT) 
BTM Book-to-Market ratio of 
acquirer 
BTM is acquirers’ book-to-market ratio 
(CSE/Mkvalt) before deal announcements.  
MOM Momentum measure of 
acquirer 
MOM is the size adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns for the six month period before deal 
announcements. 
Focus M&A focus Indicator variable equal to 1 if two-digit SIC codes 
of target and acquirer are the same, 0 otherwise. 
PctStock Percentage of stock payment Percentage of payment in mergers and acquisitions 
deals made with stock. 
OV Overpriced share Similar to Gu and Lev (2011), OV is price(PRCC) 
to earnings(EPSPX) ratio adjusted for industry 
average. Industry means that companies have the 
same four digit SIC code. A OV less than 0 is 
replaced with 0, a OV greater than 100 replaced 
with 100. 
OVI Indicator variable of 
overpriced share 
Overvalued share indicator variable which is equal 
to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-
earnings ratio (OV) is in the first quintile, zero 
otherwise 
RelSize Relative deal size over the 
size of acquirer 
RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the 





Appendix B: An Example of Finding the Speculative Portion of a Purchase Price  
Identix Inc. merged with Visionics Corp. (Both are in the biometrics industry.) The deal was 
announced on February 22, 2002 and closed on June 26, 2002. Purchase price was $334.8 
million and Identix recorded $273.1 million in goodwill. 
 
Figure A: Building blocks that identify the speculative expectations for Identix Inc. (the diagram 
follows Penman (2011, p. 68)) 
 
 
The purchase was $13.17 per share, Visionics' book value per share $0.53. Analysts following 
Visionics forecasted that its EPS would be $-0.02 for fiscal year 2002 and $0.4 the following 
year. Visionics did not pay any dividends, and the risk free rate in February 2002 was 4.91%. 
Value from short-term earnings (VSE) is estimated as 
1 2 1( ) ( ) 0.07 0.35
1 (1 ) 1.1 1.1 0.1
EPS r BPS EPS r BPSVSE
r r r
− ⋅ − ⋅ −
= + = +
+ + ⋅ ⋅
=-0.06+3.20=3.14 .  
Value from long-term growth (VLG) is Purchase Price - (BPS+VSE)= 9.49. GWother , the 







Appendix B (Continued) 
 
Figure B: Monthly size-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of Identix for 24 months after deal 
announcement 
 
Based on the size-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns, the merger was not successful; Identix 















Figure 1: Purchase Price Allocation Based on GAAP and the New Method 
 
 
This figure compares the decomposition of purchase prices based on current GAAP accounting (left column) with 
the new method introduced in the paper (right column). The left column shows goodwill to be a plugged number 
after the fair value of net identifiable assets is estimated. In the right column, the value from short-term earnings 







). The dotted line between goodwill and value from long-term growth indicates that 






Figure 2: Mean Post Deal Announcement Returns 
Figure 2 A. Mean Cumulative Raw Returns for three portfolios based on the percentage of 
uncertain growth expectations (VLG) in the purchase prices (PP) 
 
Figure 2 B. Mean size-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns for three portfolios based on the 
percentage of uncertain growth expectations (VLG) in the purchase prices (PP) 
 
These figures illustrate the main findings of the study. The portfolios are formed on deal announcement dates based 
on the percentage of uncertain growth expectations (VLG) in the purchase prices (PP). High (low) portfolio indicates 
that acquirers paid relatively more (less) than other acquirers for VLG. In both Figures 2 A and 2 B, the mean 
Cumulative Raw (Abnormal) Returns of high (low) portfolios are lower (higher) than the mean Cumulative Raw 
(Abnormal) Returns s of other portfolios. If a stock is delisted during the 24-month period after deal announcement, 
































Table 1: Sample Selection Process 
Thomson SDC Platinum mergers and acquisitions  
 
Deal announcements made between June 30, 2001 (SFAS 141 effective) 
and December 31, 2009 
 
Deal value at least $10 million 
 
Both acquirer and target are in NYSE, Nasdaq, or AMEX 
 
Acquisition of 100% shares of target 
 




(-) observations cannot be linked to Compustat,  
 
Firstcall (actual announcement date),  
 





































Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
PP(in $ millions) 215 2236.15 591.10 5340.72 191.00 1656.00 
GW(in$ millions) 215 1145.25 282.30 2556.84 96.60 977.80 
GWI 215 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
BV 215 0.39 0.30 0.37 0.19 0.43 
VSE 215 0.14 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.23 
VLG 215 0.47 0.57 0.39 0.38 0.68 
FVadj 215 0.04 0.09 0.48 -0.09 0.29 
GW 215 0.57 0.58 0.30 0.39 0.74 
GWother 215 0.10 0.03 0.52 -0.17 0.26 
AnnRet(Acquirer) 215 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.02 
Prem4wk 215 48.39 33.45 88.25 21.04 53.85 
Size 215 8.01 7.99 1.90 6.85 9.26 
Focus 215 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
PctStock 215 41.63 40.27 41.86 0.00 83.20 
OV 215 12.72 1.35 21.57 0.00 19.52 
RelSize 215 0.40 0.20 0.52 0.08 0.49 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for M&A deals, purchase price allocations based on GAAP accounting, and 
components of purchase price based on the new method introduced in the study. PP (in $ millions) is purchase price 
as reported in 10-K. GW (in $ millions) is goodwill as reported in 10-K. GWI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
goodwill impairment to identified target is reported in any year after the merger or acquisition, 0 otherwise. BV is 
the book value of the target. VSE is the value from predictable short-term earnings. VLG is the value from long-term 
growth. FVadj is the fair value adjustment of net identifiable assets. GW is the portion of the purchase price 
allocated to goodwill. GWother is the difference between the value from long-term growth (VLG) and goodwill 
(GW). AnnRet is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers around deal announcements. Prem4wk is the 
amount of premium based on the price at four weeks before deal announcement. Size is the log market value of the 
acquirer. Focus is an indicator variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same. 
PctStock is the percentage of payment made with stock. OV is acquirers' industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio. 
RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the market value of an acquirer. BV, VSA, VLG, FVadj, GW, and GWother 






Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Non-impairment Sample (GWI=0) 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
PP(in $ millions) 157 2198.29 525.20 4845.22 174.90 1780.00 
GW(in$ millions) 157 1130.90 243.50 2388.46 88.00 976.90 
GWI 157 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BV 157 0.40 0.29 0.38 0.19 0.43 
VSE 157 0.13 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.18 
VLG 157 0.48 0.59 0.40 0.41 0.71 
FVadj 157 0.04 0.08 0.50 -0.10 0.31 
GW 157 0.56 0.58 0.32 0.34 0.74 
GWother 157 0.08 0.02 0.55 -0.20 0.21 
AnnRet(Acquirer) 157 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 0.02 
Prem4wk 157 54.85* 37.96 101.27 22.91 57.48 
Size 157 8.35*** 8.37 1.80 7.07 9.54 
Focus 157 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
PctStock 157 39.37 38.44 41.04 0.00 78.10 
OV 157 16.70*** 5.97 23.57 0.00 25.90 
RelSize 157 0.25*** 0.14 0.32 0.07 0.31 
 
Panel C: Impairment Sample (GWI=1) 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
PP(in $ millions) 58 2338.64 684.50 6543.88 329.70 1465.50 
GW(in$ millions) 58 1184.09 414.80 2988.13 148.30 992.70 
GWI 58 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BV 58 0.37 0.31 0.36 0.19 0.42 
VSE 58 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.00 0.29 
VLG 58 0.44 0.50 0.37 0.32 0.63 
FVadj 58 0.05 0.10 0.39 -0.06 0.22 
GW 58 0.58 0.59 0.25 0.43 0.72 
GWother 58 0.14 0.09 0.41 -0.06 0.31 
AnnRet(Acquirer) 58 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 0.02 
Prem4wk 58 30.89 27.99 27.28 13.44 43.67 
Size 58 7.10 7.24 1.88 6.29 7.99 
Focus 58 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
PctStock 58 47.75 46.08 43.77 0.00 100.00 
OV 58 1.93 0.00 8.01 0.00 0.00 
RelSize 58 0.80 0.56 0.72 0.22 1.16 
These tables report descriptive statistics for M&A deals, purchase price allocations based on GAAP accounting, and 
components of purchase price based on the new method introduced in the study for two sub-samples: goodwill non-
impairment (Panel B), and goodwill impairment (Panel C). *,**,*** indicate significant in 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 





Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
N=217 GWI BV VSE VLG FVadj GW GWother AnnRet Prem4wk 
GWI 1 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.12 
BV 0.01 1 -0.20 -0.83 -0.77 -0.02 0.62 -0.01 0.20 
VSE 0.16 -0.40 1 -0.38 0.05 0.17 0.39 -0.05 -0.05 
VLG -0.12 -0.66 -0.28 1 0.70 -0.08 -0.81 0.04 -0.16 
FVadj -0.01 -0.55 0.16 0.46 1 -0.62 -0.90 0.00 -0.12 
GW 0.03 -0.16 0.20 0.06 -0.62 1 0.65 0.01 -0.06 
GWother 0.12 0.39 0.28 -0.68 -0.85 0.59 1 -0.02 0.09 
AnnRet -0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 1 0.04 
Prem4wk -0.19 0.03 -0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 1 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of variables used in the paper. The upper diagonal reports Pearson, the lower 
diagonal Spearman, correlations. GWI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if goodwill impairment to identified target 
is reported in any year after the merger or acquisition, 0 otherwise. BV is the book value of the target. VSE is the 
value from predictable short-term earnings. VLG is the value from long-term growth. FVadj is the fair value 
adjustment of net identifiable assets. GW is the portion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. GWother is the 
difference between the value from long-term growth (VLG) and goodwill (GW). AnnRet is announcement date (three 
day) returns of acquirers around deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount of premium based on the price at four 





Table 4: Long-term Returns of Acquirers after Deal Announcements 
 Mean Cumulative Raw Returns   Mean size-adjusted CARs 
 High Medium Low   High Medium Low 
0 m 0.00 0.00 0.00  0 m 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 m 0.00 0.00 0.00  1 m -0.01 0.02 0.00 
2 m -0.01 0.02 0.01  2 m -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
3 m 0.00 0.02 0.00  3 m 0.00 0.00 0.01 
4 m 0.00 0.02 0.03  4 m -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
5 m -0.04 0.03 -0.01  5 m -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
6 m -0.04 0.01 0.01  6 m -0.04 0.00 0.02 
7 m -0.05 0.05 0.04  7 m -0.03 0.00 0.01 
8 m -0.05 0.05 0.02  8 m -0.04 -0.01 0.00 
9 m -0.06 0.04 0.02  9 m -0.05 -0.01 0.01 
10 m -0.06 0.03 0.04  10 m -0.05 -0.02 0.01 
11 m -0.05 0.03 0.06  11 m -0.05 -0.02 0.05 
12 m -0.04 0.02 0.11  12 m -0.05 -0.02 0.05 
13 m -0.04 0.02 0.13  13 m -0.05 0.01 0.04 
14 m -0.02 0.06 0.14  14 m -0.03 0.01 0.05 
15 m 0.01 0.06 0.16  15 m -0.02 0.01 0.05 
16 m 0.03 0.08 0.15  16 m -0.03 0.03 0.04 
17 m 0.03 0.10 0.15  17 m -0.03 0.03 0.05 
18 m 0.05 0.10 0.18  18 m -0.02 0.03 0.07 
19 m 0.07 0.10 0.22  19 m 0.01 0.03 0.09 
20 m 0.09 0.12 0.24  20 m 0.00 0.03 0.09 
21 m 0.09 0.13 0.26  21 m 0.01 0.06 0.10 
22 m 0.11 0.17 0.27  22 m 0.01 0.05 0.08 
23 m 0.13 0.16 0.26  23 m -0.01 0.05 0.06 
24 m 0.10 0.18 0.23  24 m -0.01 0.05 0.05 
 
This table reports mean Cumulative Raw Returns and size-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR s) for 24 
months after M&A deal announcement dates (Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of this table). Three portfolios (high, 






Table 5: Long-term Returns from Cross-sectional Regressions and Value from Long-term 
Growth 
Panel A: 1tyear +  
t+1Ret  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.30* (-1.85) -0.29* (-1.78) -0.29* (-1.78) -0.24 (-1.39) 
VLG -0.21*** (-2.73) -0.22*** (-2.96) -0.22*** (-2.91) -0.23*** (-2.98) 
AnnRet     0.10 (0.23) 0.07 (0.16) 
Prem4wk     0.00 (0.23) -0.00 (-0.25) 
Beta -0.00 (-0.05) -0.00 (-0.06) -0.00 (-0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 
Size 0.05*** (3.43) 0.05*** (3.46) 0.05*** (3.45) 0.04*** (2.97) 
BTM 0.00*** (3.45) 0.00*** (3.57) 0.00*** (3.54) 0.00*** (3.06) 
MOM   -0.08 (-0.80) -0.07 (-0.78) -0.05 (-0.48) 
Focus       0.05 (0.88) 
PctStock       -0.00 (-1.36) 
OVI       0.00 (0.02) 
PctStock OVI×        0.00* (1.73) 
RelSize       -0.02 (-0.23) 
         
2Adj R  0.09  0.1  0.1  0.13  
N 215  215  215  215  
 
This table reports the estimation results of equation (1) with t+1Ret  on the left hand side: t+1Ret  is size adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns for one year after deal announcement. VLG is the value from long-term growth. AnnRet 
is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers around deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount of 
premium based on the price at four weeks before deal announcement. Beta is estimated from a regression of 
monthly returns ( fR R− ) on market returns ( m fR R− ) using the 36-month return period. Size is the log market 
value of the acquirer. BTM is acquirers’ book-to-market ratio before the deal announcement. MOM is the size 
adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for the six month period before the deal announcement. Focus is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same. PctStock is the percentage of 
payment made with stock. OVI is an overvalued share indicator variable which is equal to one if the acquirer's 
industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first quintile, zero otherwise. RelSize is the relative size of a deal 






Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: 2tyear +  
t+2Ret  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.52*** (-2.64) -0.51*** (-2.63) -0.51** (-2.59) -0.29 (-1.41) 
VLG -0.21** (-2.20) -0.21** (-2.32) -0.21** (-2.30) -0.20** (-2.14) 
AnnRet     -0.04 (-0.08) 0.13 (0.27) 
Prem4wk     -0.00 (-0.46) -0.00 (-1.40) 
Beta 0.05 (0.59) 0.06 (0.65) 0.06 (0.64) 0.07 (0.77) 
Size 0.07*** (4.23) 0.07*** (4.33) 0.07*** (4.30) 0.04** (2.57) 
BTM 0.00*** (2.77) 0.00*** (2.98) 0.00*** (2.97) 0.00 (0.86) 
MOM   -0.48 (-1.59) -0.48 (-1.58) -0.53* (-1.80) 
Focus       0.05 (0.75) 
PctStock       0.00 (0.76) 
OVI       0.02 (0.17) 
PctStock OVI×        0.00 (0.94) 
RelSize       -0.25*** (-2.66) 
         
2Adj R  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.18  
N 210  210  210  210  
 
This table reports the estimation results of equation (1) with t+2Ret  on the left hand side: t+2Ret  is size adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns for two years after deal announcement. VLG is the value from long-term growth. 
AnnRet is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers around deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount 
of premium based on the price at four weeks before deal announcement. Beta is estimated from a regression of 
monthly returns ( fR R− ) on market returns ( m fR R− ) using the 36-month return period. Size is the log market 
value of the acquirer. BTM is acquirers’ book-to-market ratio before the deal announcement. MOM is the size 
adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for the six month period before the deal announcement. Focus is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same. PctStock is the percentage of 
payment made with stock. OVI is an overvalued share indicator variable which is equal to one if the acquirer's 
industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first quintile, zero otherwise. RelSize is the relative size of a deal 





Table 6: Short-term Market Reactions and Value from Long-term Growth 
AnnRet (1)  (2) 
Intercept 0.02 (1.33)  0.02 (1.27) 
VLG -0.00 (-0.04)  -0.00 (-0.03) 
Prem4wk    0.00 (0.20) 
Focus -0.03** (-2.21)  -0.03** (-2.20) 
PctStock -0.00*** (-3.75)  -0.00*** (-3.74) 
OVI -0.00 (-0.22)  -0.00 (-0.25) 
PctStock OVI×  -0.00 (-0.53)  -0.00 (-0.51) 
RelSize -0.00 (-0.21)  -0.00 (-0.20) 
      
2Adj R  0.14   0.14  
N 215   215  
 
This table represents the estimation result of equation (2): AnnRet is the announcement date (three day) returns of 
acquirers around deal announcements. VLG is the value from long-term growth. Prem4wk is the amount of premium 
based on the price at four weeks before deal announcement. Focus is an indicator variable equal to one if the two-
digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same. PctStock is the percentage of payment made with stock. OVI is 
an overvalued share indicator variable which is equal to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings 
ratio is in the first quintile, zero otherwise. RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the market value of an acquirer. 







Table 7: Goodwill Impairments and Value from Long-term Growth 
GWI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.76 (0.16) 0.96 (0.24) 0.95 (0.24) 1.09 (0.30) 0.95 (0.24) 1.09 (0.30) 
GW 1.34 (2.02) 1.29 (1.84)     1.25 (1.79) 1.22 (1.65) 
GWother     1.25 (1.79) 1.22 (1.65)     
VLG     2.35** (4.20) 2.28** (3.88) 1.10* (2.71) 1.07 (2.52) 
AnnRet   -0.58 (0.04)   -0.25 (0.01)   -0.25 (0.01) 
Prem4wk   0.00 (0.40)   0.00 (0.21)   0.00 (0.21) 
Size -0.42*** (8.84) -0.42*** (8.84) -0.51*** (10.77) -0.51*** (10.67) -0.51*** (10.77) -0.51*** (10.67) 
Focus 0.18 (0.10) 0.21 (0.13) 0.36 (0.40) 0.38 (0.43) 0.36 (0.40) 0.38 (0.43) 
PctStock 0.00 (0.55) 0.00 (0.44) 0.00 (0.55) 0.00 (0.47) 0.00 (0.55) 0.00 (0.47) 
OVI -2.80 (2.81) -2.70 (2.57) -2.79* (2.66) -2.73 (2.53) -2.79* (2.66) -2.73 (2.53) 
PctStock  
OVI×  
-0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.06) -0.01 (0.10) -0.02 (0.11) -0.01 (0.10) -0.02 (0.11) 
             
Year yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
targetSIC yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
             
Pseudo 
2R  
0.40  0.40  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  
N 215  215  215  215  215  215  
 
Table 7 reports the estimation results of equation (3): GWI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if goodwill impairment to identified target is reported in any year 
after the merger or acquisition, 0 otherwise. GW is the portion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. GWother is the difference between the value from 
long-term growth (VLG) and goodwill (GW). VLG is the value from long-term growth. AnnRet is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers around 
deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount of premium based on the price at four weeks before deal announcement. Size is the log market value of the 
acquirer. Focus is an indicator variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and acquirer are the same. PctStock is the percentage of payment 
made with stock. OVI is an overvalued share indicator variable which is equal to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first 






Table 8: Goodwill and Value from Long-term Returns in Predicting Long-term Returns 
 t+1Ret  t+2Ret  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.26 (-1.46) -0.21 (-1.13) -0.21 (-1.13) -0.43** (-2.17) -0.38* (-1.89) -0.38* (-1.89) 
GW -0.01 (-0.05)   -0.04 (-0.45) 0.13 (1.16)   0.10 (0.88) 
GWother   -0.04 (-0.45)     0.10 (0.88)   
VLG   -0.28** (-1.97) -0.24*** (-2.92)   -0.08 (-0.46) -0.18* (-1.92) 
AnnRet 0.10 (0.21) 0.07 (0.16) 0.07 (0.16) 0.12 (0.23) 0.15 (0.30) 0.15 (0.30) 
Prem4wk 0.00 (0.44) -0.00 (-0.30) -0.00 (-0.30) -0.00 (-0.67) -0.00 (-1.08) -0.00 (-1.08) 
Beta 0.02 (0.33) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.06 (0.97) 0.05 (0.87) 0.05 (0.87) 
Size 0.03* (1.97) 0.04*** (2.97) 0.04*** (2.97) 0.04** (2.34) 0.05*** (3.06) 0.05*** (3.06) 
BTM 0.00*** (2.84) 0.00*** (3.07) 0.00*** (3.07) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.11) 0.00 (0.11) 
MOM 0.00 (0.00) -0.05 (-0.53) -0.05 (-0.53) -0.42 (-1.41) -0.44 (-1.44) -0.44 (-1.44) 
Focus 0.06 (1.07) 0.04 (0.80) 0.04 (0.80) 0.07 (1.00) 0.06 (0.83) 0.06 (0.83) 
PctStock -0.00 (-1.21) -0.00 (-1.35) -0.00 (-1.35) 0.00 (0.77) 0.00 (0.61) 0.00 (0.61) 
OVI 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 0.04 (0.43) 0.04 (0.37) 0.04 (0.37) 
PctStock  
OVI×   0.00 (1.43) 0.00* (1.73) 0.00* (1.73) 0.00 (0.55) 0.00 (0.83) 0.00 (0.83) 
RelSize -0.03 (-0.38) -0.02 (-0.21) -0.02 (-0.21) -0.26*** (-2.88) -0.25*** (-2.69) 
-
0.25*** (-2.69) 
             
2Adj R  0.08  0.13  0.13  0.17  0.19  0.19  
N 215  215  215  210  210  210  
 
This table reports the estimation results for equation (4): t+iRet  is size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for one or two years after deal announcements. 
VLG is the value from long-term growth. GW is the portion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. GWother is the difference between the value from 
long-term growth (VLG) and goodwill (GW). VLG is the value from long-term growth. AnnRet is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers around 
deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount of premium based on the price at four weeks before deal announcement. Control variables are as defined in 





Table 9: Future Returns from Cross-sectional Regression for Firms with Negative Value from 
Short-term Earnings 
 t+1Ret  t+2Ret  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.22 (-1.23) -0.19 (-1.03) -0.46* (-1.76) -0.04 (-0.19) 
VLG -0.25** (-2.20) -0.23** (-2.26) -0.02 (-0.09) -0.02 (-0.13) 
NegVSE 0.15 (1.22) 0.17 (1.44) 0.40*** (2.61) 0.28** (2.20) 
VLG×NegVSE -0.07 (-0.39) -0.12 (-0.67) -0.49** (-1.99) -0.42** (-2.02) 
AnnRet   -0.27 (-0.52)   -0.76 (-1.40) 
Prem4wk   0.00 (0.84)   0.00 (0.13) 
Beta -0.03 (-0.50) -0.02 (-0.42) 0.04 (0.37) 0.02 (0.16) 
Size 0.05*** (2.79) 0.04** (2.44) 0.06*** (3.30) 0.02 (1.23) 
BTM 0.00*** (3.04) 0.00*** (2.92) 0.00 (1.35) -0.00 (-0.16) 
MOM -0.02 (-0.16) 0.01 (0.09) -0.47 (-1.32) -0.60* (-1.84) 
Focus   -0.00* (-1.78)   0.00 (0.96) 
PctStock   0.01 (0.19)   0.02 (0.22) 
OVI   0.01 (0.16)   0.09 (0.81) 
PctStock OVI×    0.00 (1.59)   -0.00 (-0.08) 
RelSize   0.02 (0.29)   -0.32*** (-3.05) 
         
2Adj R  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.23  
N 215  215  210  210  
 
This table reports the estimation results for equation (5): t+iRet  is size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for 
one or two years after deal announcement. VLG is the value from long-term growth. NegVSE is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if VSE is smaller than 0, 0 otherwise. AnnRet is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers around 
deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount of premium based on the price at four weeks before deal 
announcement. . Beta is estimated from a regression of monthly returns ( fR R− ) on market returns ( m fR R− ) 
using the 36-month return period. Size is the log market value of the acquirer. BTM is acquirers’ book-to-market 
ratio before the deal announcement. MOM is the size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for the six month period 
before the deal announcement Focus is an indicator variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and 
acquirer are the same. PctStock is the percentage of payment made with stock. OVI is an overvalued share indicator 
variable which is equal to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first quintile, zero 
otherwise. RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the market value of an acquirer. *,**,*** indicate significant in 






Table 10: Value of Targets and Its Components in Predicting Long-term Returns 
 t+1Ret  t+2Ret  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.47*** (-2.79) -0.50*** (-2.96) -0.51*** (-2.65) -0.55*** (-2.95) 
TgtVal 0.23*** (2.98)   0.19** (2.13)   
BV   0.27*** (2.69)   0.25** (2.45) 
VSE   0.13 (1.41)   0.05 (0.34) 
AnnRet 0.07 (0.16) 0.03 (0.06) 0.16 (0.32) 0.10 (0.20) 
Prem4wk -0.00 (-0.25) -0.00 (-0.40) -0.00 (-1.25) -0.00 (-1.43) 
Beta 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 0.05 (0.86) 0.05 (0.82) 
Size 0.04*** (2.97) 0.05*** (3.28) 0.05*** (3.03) 0.06*** (3.48) 
BTM 0.00*** (3.06) 0.00*** (2.92) 0.00 (0.19) -0.00 (-0.00) 
MOM -0.05 (-0.48) -0.05 (-0.47) -0.48 (-1.61) -0.47 (-1.54) 
Focus 0.05 (0.88) 0.05 (0.87) 0.05 (0.68) 0.04 (0.66) 
PctStock -0.00 (-1.36) -0.00 (-1.47) 0.00 (0.64) 0.00 (0.48) 
OVI 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.04 (0.41) 0.04 (0.40) 
PctStock OVI×  0.00* (1.73) 0.00* (1.69) 0.00 (0.86) 0.00 (0.78) 
RelSize -0.02 (-0.23) -0.00 (-0.01) -0.25*** (-2.65) -0.23** (-2.53) 
         
2Adj R  0.13  0.13  0.18  0.19  
N 215  215  210  210  
 
This table reports the estimation results for equation (6): t+iRet  is size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for 
one or two years after deal announcement. TgtVal is the value of a target (TgtVal=BV+VSE). BV is book value of a 
target. VSE is the value from short-term earnings. AnnRet is announcement date (three day) returns of acquirers 
around deal announcements. Prem4wk is the amount of premium based on the price at four weeks before deal 
announcement. . Beta is estimated from a regression of monthly returns ( fR R− ) on market returns ( m fR R− ) 
using the 36-month return period. Size is the log market value of the acquirer. BTM is acquirers’ book-to-market 
ratio before the deal announcement. MOM is the size adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for the six month period 
before the deal announcement Focus is an indicator variable equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of target and 
acquirer are the same. PctStock is the percentage of payment made with stock. OVI is an overvalued share indicator 
variable which is equal to one if the acquirer's industry-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio is in the first quintile, zero 
otherwise. RelSize is the relative size of a deal over the market value of an acquirer. *,**,*** indicate significant in 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
